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ABSTRACT
Interactive Information Retrieval refers to the branch of In-
formation Retrieval that considers the retrieval process with
respect to a wide range of contexts, which may affect the
user’s information seeking experience. The identification
and representation of such contexts has been the object of
the principle of Polyrepresentation, a theoretical framework
for reasoning about different representations arising from in-
teractive information retrieval in a given context. Although
the principle of Polyrepresentation has received attention
from many researchers, not much empirical work has been
done based on it. One reason may be that it has not yet
been formalised mathematically.
In this paper we propose an up-to-date and flexible math-
ematical formalisation of the principle of Polyrepresenta-
tion for information needs. Specifically, we apply Subjec-
tive Logic to model different representations of information
needs as beliefs marked by degrees of uncertainty. We com-
bine such beliefs using different logical operators, and we
discuss these combinations with respect to different retrieval
scenarios and situations. A formal model is introduced and
discussed, with illustrative applications to the modelling of
information needs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages]:
Mathematical Logic; H.1.1 [Models and Principles]: Sys-
tems and Information Theory—information theory ; H.3.3
[Information Storage and Retrieval]: Information Search
and Retrieval—search process, query formulation
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1. INTRODUCTION
Information Retrieval (IR) is primarily concerned with de-
veloping models and systems that allow users to find infor-
mation objects, such as documents, images or videos, which
are relevant to their information needs, in an effective and
efficient way. Interactive IR (IIR) can be seen as a branch
of IR, which considers not only the nature of the retrieval
model or retrieval object at hand, but also the different ac-
tors of the interaction process, for instance how end-users
interact with IR systems and how IR systems should be
designed to best support users in the decision processes in-
volved in searching the systems. In a cognitive approach to
IIR, the different actors in the interaction process contribute
interpretations of their situations and pre-suppositions of
the world as well as of the information structures involved.
Such interpretations take the form of different representa-
tions, for instance, documents, images, music tunes, index-
ing schemes, retrieval algorithms, as well as user request
formulations and work task descriptions representing their
information requirements and problem state [19]. In this
perspective, such representations, which are manifestations
of human cognition, reflection and ideas, can be seen as be-
ing contextual to one another, and also as being in a state
of interplay with each other over time [28].
The principle of Polyrepresentation is a well-known the-
oretical framework for handling multiple contexts in IR,
which contends that the use of cognitively and functionally
different representations of information objects in IR may
enhance retrieval quality [18]. The principle of Polyrepresen-
tation makes deliberate use of a variety of context interpre-
tations by means of the evidence that their representations
provide [19]. Specifically, Polyrepresentation encompasses
two kinds of representations:
• Cognitively different representations, which have been
derived from the interpretations by different actors.
• Functionally different representations, which have been
derived from the same actor, such as author generated
text structures, image features, diagram captions, and
references.
Central to the principle of Polyrepresentation is the fol-
lowing hypothesis [19]: “The more interpretations of dif-
ferent cognitive and functional nature [...] that point to a
set of objects in so-called cognitive overlaps1, and the more
intensely they do so, the higher the probability that such
objects are relevant (pertinent, useful) to a perceived work
task/interest to be solved, the information (need) situation
at hand, the topic required, or/and the influencing context
of that situation.”
Essentially, the principle of Polyrepresentation attempts
to make simultaneous combinations of different types of ev-
idence (representative features) that are cognitively contex-
tual to one another, in a structured way. However, even
though Polyrepresentation has been proposed more than 15
years ago, relatively few empirically based studies have ap-
plied it explicitly for IR purposes (an overview is given in
Section 2.1). What is currently missing from the princi-
ple of Polyrepresentation is an up-to-date flexible mathe-
matical formalisation that will enable the implementation
of Polyrepresentation in practice without loss of generality,
expressiveness or flexibility of the principle.
In this work, we propose formalising Polyrepresentation
using Subjective Logic, which is a type of probabilistic logic
for reasoning in the presence of uncertainty [21]. According
to the subjective approach to probabilities, the probability
of an event is the degree to which someone believes it, as
indicated by their willingness to bet or take other actions.
This is different to the frequentist approach to probabilities,
under which, the probability of an event is the frequency
with which it occurs.
The reason why Subjective Logic is particularly attrac-
tive for formalising Polyrepresentation is two-fold. Firstly,
Subjective Logic has a very flexible and powerful calculus,
which allows us to express representations mathematically
with degrees of confidence and uncertainty in the quality of
the representation. Practically this means that representa-
tions are expressed in a more accurate and specific way, and
that any abstractions or estimations we might make when
inducing them will be properly reflected formally. Secondly,
Subjective Logic has an extended and very powerful set of
operators that allow us to combine different representations
in fourteen different ways. This flexibility in combining dif-
ferent representations is exactly what has been so far missing
from the principle of Polyrepresentation [26]. Different com-
binations are appropriate for different situations and repre-
sentations, and we show that Subjective Logic provides a
powerful toolset for realising but also reasoning about dif-
ferent combinations. Practically this means that we can se-
lect the ‘most appropriate’ combination of representations,
where we define ‘most appropriate’ not according to retrieval
performance, but according to the features of the represen-
tations and of the situation or search scenario at hand.
1Polyrepresentation defines cognitive overlaps as the over-
laps of sets of objects created by the divergent cognitive and
functional representations.
The formalisation of the principle of Polyrepresentation
with Subjective Logic is realised by making a clear and
mathematically tractable analogy between cognitive agents
that constitute different representations in Polyrepresenta-
tion and opinions that constitute different expressions of be-
lief in Subjective Logic. This work introduces this idea and
provides an illustration of its application to the Polyrep-
resentation of information needs. In addition, two different
combinations of representations are presented and discussed,
accompanied by illustrative examples. The ideas presented
in this paper are not restricted to the specific representa-
tions or combinations treated here. The proposed formalism
is generic, meaning that any other type or number of repre-
sentations could be used, and also that different Subjective
Logic combination operators could also be applied.
The main contributions of this work are the following.
Firstly, this work bridges two distinct disciplines, namely
Information Science and Formal Logic, in order to propose
a mathematical formalisation of a well-known principle in
cognitive IIR. Secondly, the formalisation of Polyrepresenta-
tion using Subjective Logic allows for the first time to model
aspects and features of the representations in degrees of un-
certainty, in a precise way. This is a departure from the so far
Boolean way in which Polyrepresentation has predominantly
been practically applied [26]. Finally, the highly expressive
calculus of combination operators in Subjective Logic allows
to formally select among various different types of combina-
tions, according to the context or situation at hand. This
paves the way for selective Polyrepresentation, which is an
area that has not received enough attention so far.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 overviews past work on two different and until today
distinct areas, namely (i) the use of Polyrepresentation in
IR, and (ii) the use of formal logic in IR. To our knowledge,
there is no past work on formalising Polyrepresentation us-
ing logic. Section 3 introduces the principle of Polyrepresen-
tation on information needs and presents our formalisation
of the Polyrepresentation of information needs using Subjec-
tive Logic. Section 4 discusses the combination of different
representations using Subjective Logic operators. Illustra-
tive examples are provided. Section 5 discusses the role of
interaction in our proposed Subjective Logic framework of
Polyrepresentation. Finally, Section 6 summarises our pro-
posal and its contributions, and proposes future extensions
of this work.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Polyrepresentation in IR
The principle of Polyrepresentation was initially formu-
lated by Ingwersen (1996), who intended it to be applicable
to both exact and best match IR [18]. However, in a critical
examination of the practical applicability of Polyrepresenta-
tion in mainstream IR, Larsen (2005) argued that the prin-
ciple is inherently Boolean [26]. To remedy that, a Polyrep-
resentation continuum was proposed, as a model for devel-
oping the principle towards greater practical applicability
[26, 27]. The continuum was defined over two poles, a struc-
tured and an unstructured pole respectively. This allowed
for any implementation of the Polyrepresentation principle
to be discussed in terms of its structure. This Polyrepresen-
tation continuumwas further empirically tested by Larsen et
al. (2006), and also extended by the addition of a second di-
mension to it, which represented query structure and modus
[28]. Based on these extensions, Skov et al. (2008) [49] in-
vestigated Polyrepresentation with focus on inter- and intra-
document features, in the medical domain. Five functionally
and/or cognitively different document representations were
identified. The Polyrepresentation hypothesis predicted that
combinations of different document representations could
lead to improved retrieval performance, compared to sin-
gle document representations. In this study, combinations
of document representations were studied in terms of cog-
nitive overlaps between documents. It was found that the
cognitive overlaps generated by combinations of three or four
representations of different nature (in accordance with the
Polyrepresentation hypothesis) led to more precise retrieval
than overlaps generated by (non-Polyrepresentation) combi-
nations of two representations or from single representations.
This finding agreed with the predictions made by the princi-
ple of Polyrepresentation. This result applied to both struc-
tured and unstructured query modes. This study was an
investigation of Polyrepresentation on the document-level,
in the sense that it studied representations of documents.
Apart from the document-level, the principle of Polyrepre-
sentation has also been applied on the level of retrieval mod-
els, to study different conceptual or algorithmic representa-
tions of retrieval models [29]. In this light, each retrieval
model is regarded as a representation of a unique interpre-
tation of IR. The study by Larsen et al. (2009) examined
representations consisting of four best-performing retrieval
models from TREC-5 [59]. These representations were com-
bined according to the principle of Polyrepresentation, which
predicted that combinations of very different, but equally
good, retrieval models would outperform each constituent as
well as their intermediate (non-Polyrepresentation) combi-
nations. An experimental evaluation was carried out against
a baseline of eleven different intermediate combinations and
also of the four individual retrieval models. Polyrepresen-
tation was overall found to outperform the baselines, albeit
with some instability. The central observation drawn from
this study was that polyrepresenting retrieval models could
be beneficial to retrieval only if the models were quite dis-
similar on the conceptual or algorithmical level and equally
well-performing, in that order of importance.
This last condition, namely to combine representations
that are equally well-performing, is quite restrictive, in the
sense that it prohibits the combination of unequally per-
forming representations that might nevertheless contribute
something potentially good to retrieval. More importantly,
this condition is highly dependent on how one defines ‘well-
performing’. Different search scenarios, situations and con-
texts define ‘good performance’ in very different ways. It is
exactly this point that we target in this paper, by proposing
a flexible Subjective Logic formalism. Specifically, by for-
malising a representation in degrees of uncertainty, we are
allowed to combine different and unequal representations
without compromising the outcome of the combination, sim-
ply because we can control the contribution of ‘better’ or
‘worse’ representations to their combination.
In addition to applications of Polyrepresentation on the
level of documents and retrieval models, Polyrepresentation
has also been used on the query level, and specifically for
Interactive Query Expansion (IQE) [10]. The main idea
behind IQE is to suggest terms to the users during their
search in order to enable better retrieval performance. How-
ever, the lack of cognitive and functional support during this
query refinement process often has counter-effects for the
users, who cannot always select terms appropriately, espe-
cially when terms are stripped of their context. Diriye et al.
(2009) tackled this problem by using Polyrepresentation to
improve the presentation of IQE terms to the users. They
showed how providing supplementary information on IQE
terms can address the ambiguity and uncertainty surround-
ing IQE, and improve the perceived usefulness of the terms.
Additionally, the principle of Polyrepresentation has re-
cently been applied to create test collections without per-
forming relevance assessments. Efron and Winget (2010)
proposed the idea of query aspects based on the principle
of Polyrepresentation, and used multiple query aspects to
create pseudo-relevance judgments without human interven-
tion. They were able to show that these resulted in a rank
ordering of IR systems that correlated highly with rankings
based on relevance judgments from human assessors [12].
Finally, most recently, Frommholz et al. have been work-
ing towards formalising Polyrepresentation within a geomet-
rical IR framework inspired by quantum mechanics [14]. In
their model, representations are modelled in Hilbert space,
and combined by means of their tensor product. This dif-
fers from our work, where representations are modelled as
subjective beliefs and combined using logical operators of
Subjective Logic.
2.2 Formal Logic in IR
Subjective Logic is a type of formal logic, and more specif-
ically of probabilistic logic, which allows to model degrees
of uncertainty about an event (see [21] for an introduction,
and [45] to trace the origins of subjective probabilites). Sub-
jective Logic is not the only formalism to model degrees of
uncertainty. Several other mathematical models have been
proposed to this end, starting from the Bayesian model of
subjective probabilities (see [13] for a historical survey), as
well as generalisations of the Bayesian model (see [52] for a
survey), the best-known of which is Dempster-Shafer’s Belief
Theory [7, 46] (see [21] for an elaborated discussion on the
differences between Dempster-Shafer and Subjective Logic,
or [34] for a more succint version).
One of the earliest applications of formal logic to IR was
Van Rijsbergen’s Logical Uncertainty Principle [56]. Various
different types of formal logic have since been applied to IR,
such as Modal Logic [16], Situation Theory [8], Plausible
Reasoning [15], and Terminological Logic [1], to name some
of the main ones.
Formally, Modal Logic is based on the notion of possible
worlds, which can be connected to each other via accessibility
relations. Given a proposition, the evaluation of its truth is
realised with respect to a possible world (see [25] for more).
Nie (1992) used Modal Logic to develop a formal IR model,
which integrated semantic-based and probabilistic-based ap-
proaches of deciding the relevance between a document and
a query [41]. In Nie’s model, documents were seen as worlds,
and queries were seen as formulae. A document d was rel-
evant to a query q, if q ‘were true’ in d or in a world d′
accessible from d. This accessibility relation captured doc-
uments containing synonymous or near-synonymous terms,
or document hyperlinks.
A variant of the above model for IR was proposed by
Chevallet [3]. This model was formalised using conceptual
graphs [54], which are graphs built out of concepts and
their associated semantics. In Chevallet’s model, documents
and queries were represented by conceptual graphs, and the
transformation process was instantiated by operations per-
formed on the graphs. Another variant of the possible worlds
formalisation was proposed by Crestani and Van Rijsbergen
[6], who used Logical Imaging. In their model, terms were
seen as worlds, while documents and queries were seen as
propositions. A term t ‘made a document true’ if that term
belonged to that document. An extension of this model was
proposed by Nie et al. (1996), by including user knowledge
in the evaluation of the relevance of a document to a query
[20]. More recently, Zuccon et al. (2008) applied Logical
Imaging to IR in terms of Quantum Theory through the use
of an analogy between states of a quantum system (i.e. the
dynamics of a physical system) and terms in documents [61].
Another type of formal logic used in IR is Situation The-
ory, which reasons about the concept of information and
the manner in which cognitive agents handle and respond
to the information picked up from their environment. Situ-
ation Theory defines the nature of information flow and the
mechanisms that give rise to such a flow by representing in-
formation objects as types. Nothing is said about the truth
of a type; a type is just the representation of an information
object. What makes a type true is the situation (a partially
defined world) from which the information represented by
that type is extracted. An application of Situation Theory
to IR was proposed by Huibers et al. (1996) [17]. Under this
model, a document was seen as a situation s and a query
was seen as a type φ. The document was relevant to the
query if there existed a flow of information from a situation
s to a situation s′, such that s′ ‘supported’ φ. The nature
of the flow depended on the constraints capturing semantic
relationships.
Another type of logic used in IR is Terminological Logic
[38]. In this formalism, documents were represented by indi-
vidual constants, and classes of documents were represented
as concepts. Concepts were characterised by the notion of
conceptual containment. Queries were also represented as
concepts, hence the retrieval task consisted in finding all
documents contained in the concept representing the query.
Plausible Reasoning has also been used to develop a logical
model for IR by Bruza and van der Weide (1992) [2], in an
attempt to capture syntactically related information. Doc-
uments and queries were represented by index expressions
defined upon noun-phrases. The inference process was then
based on a series of strict derivation and plausible deriva-
tion mechanisms. Each type of derivation came with its
own set of rules and axioms. Relevance occured if, given
two index expressions d and q, representing the document
and the query respectively, it could be proven that d ‘im-
plied’ q. Somewhat similar to plausible reasoning is Ab-
ductive Reasoning, which has also been applied to IR us-
ing semantic rather that syntactic term relations, by Muller
and Kutschekmanesch (1995) [39]. More generally, seman-
tic, syntactic, or other linguistic aspects of information have
been modelled by various extensions of formal logic to IR,
for instance see Chiaramella and Chevallet (1992) [4].
Particular aspects of formal logic have also been used to
address specific aspects or processes in IR, for instance Be-
lief Revision has been used to model IR agents [35], to es-
timate the similarity between a document and a query [36],
and more recently to model adaptive and context-sensitive
IR [30]. Furthermore, Fuzzy logic has been used to enhance
different stages of image retrieval, such as indexing [48] or
relevance feedback [31], and to model personalised IR [42].
Among the more recent applications of formal logic to IR,
one may note the use of Description Logic to model high-
precision IR [44] and multimedia IR for educational pur-
poses [33]. The Dempster-Shafer theory mentioned earlier
remains one of the most widely used logical formalisms in
IR. It has been applied to build a complete and holistic
IR framework [25], but also to integrate Web evidence into
IR [55], to integrate evidence of query difficulty into Web IR
in the form of semantic scope [43], as well as to relate depen-
dent indices of IR systems [47]. Finally, to our knowledge,
the only prior use of Subjective Logic to IR has been the
recent work of [34], who used it to model query difficulty as
a subjective belief, formulated on the basis of various types
of linguistic evidence.
There exist further applications of formal logic to IR, re-
views of which can be found in [5, 25, 58]. A more indepth
treatment of formal representations for IR can be found
in [57].
3. MODELLING POLYREPRESENTATION
WITH SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
In order to model the principle of Polyrepresentation using
Subjective Logic, we create an analogy between representa-
tions of information objects (from Polyrepresentation) and
subjective beliefs (from Subjective Logic). Under this anal-
ogy, polyrepresenting an information object (i.e. combining
different representations of an information object) is equiv-
alent to combining subjective beliefs about the truth of that
object. Since each representation may have a different de-
gree of uncertainty regarding the enhancement that it may
contribute when used for polyrepresentation, we propose to:
• formalise this uncertainty and consider it in the com-
bination of representations;
• select different combination operations according to
different retrieval contexts and situations.
This section explains how we do this, and Section 4 dis-
cusses the implications of this analogy to IR.
3.1 Belief Model with Subjective Logic
The first step towards formalising Polyrepresentation with
Subjective Logic consists in defining a belief model. The
belief model can be regarded as the setting upon which we
will reason about representations as beliefs.
Belief models define a set of possible situations, for in-
stance a set of possible states of a given system, called frame
of discernment. This frame is defined over a proposition,
i.e. a statement. It is assumed that the system cannot be
in more than one elementary state at the same time, or in
other words, only one elementary state can be true at any
one time. Figure 1 illustrates a frame of discernment de-
noted by Θ with four elementary states x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ Θ.
Given a frame of discernment over a proposition, one can
estimate the probability expectation that this proposition is
true. This probability expectation is computed using evi-
dence, which is said to come from ‘observers’. An observer
can assign to a state a belief mass, which represents his be-
lief that this state is true with respect to the proposition.
Let m denote belief mass assigned to state x of a frame of
discernment Θ, then the following holds:
x1 x2 x3 x4
Θ
Figure 1: Frame of discernment Θ with states x1, x2,
x3, x4.
mΘ(x) ≥ 0 mΘ(∅) = 0
∑
x∈2Θ
mΘ(x) = 1 (1)
where 2Θ denotes the powerset of Θ.
Subjective Logic considers the belief of an observer about
the truth of a proposition as a subjective belief marked by
degrees of uncertainty, and it calls it opinion. The opinion
owner and the proposition are attributes of an opinion. More
specifically, an opinion about the truth of state x is defined
as the following ordered quadruple:
ωAx ≡ (b, d, u, a) (2)
where superscriptA is the opinion’s owner (i.e the observer),
b is the belief mass supporting that the specified proposition
is true (i.e. the observer’s belief), d is the belief mass
supporting that the specified proposition is false (i.e. the
observer’s disbelief)2, u is the amount of uncommitted
belief mass (i.e. the observer’s uncertainty), and a is
the apriori probability in the absence of committed belief
mass (divided uniformily among the states). It holds that
b + d+ u = 1 and b, d, u, a ∈ [0, 1]. The uncertainty d of an
observer’s opinion about the truth of a given state can be
interpreted as something that fills the void in the absence of
both belief and disbelief. Total uncertainty can be expressed
by assigning b+ d = 0. Clearly, an opinion where b+ d = 1
is equivalent to a traditional probability (no uncertainty).
The probability expectation3 of an opinion is: E = b+ au.
3.2 Belief Model of Information Needs
In this work we focus on polyrepresenting information
needs. For the purpose of representing an information need
as a belief model, we need to take three steps:
1. Define a frame of discernment over a proposition.
2. Define the states of the frame of discernment.
3. Define the observers who assign opinions about the
proposition of the frame.
3.2.1 Definitions 1 & 2: Proposition and States
We define the proposition of our frame of discernment as
the abstract information need conceived by the user. This
abstract information need is not static, but it tends to al-
ter dynamically [18]. In fact, empirical IIR research has
shown that the information need perception often changes
as a search session progresses (see [18] for an overview). If
the conception of the information need is seen as a cognitive
process, then the changes undergone in this conception can
2The observer’s disbelief d corresponds to doubt in Shafer
(1976) [46].
3The probability expectation of an opinion is equivalent to
the pignistic probability [53].
be seen as states in the cognitive process, which we repre-
sent as states in our frame of discernment. This allows us
to assign belief mass to the abstract information need as a
whole (m(Θ)), but also to different states during the cog-
nitive process of the information need (mΘ(x)). This is a
flexible and potentially powerful formalism. For instance,
being able to model the temporal cognitive changes in the
information need may enable us to use any information ex-
tracted from the user over an interactive search session to
improve the retrieval results.
3.2.2 Definition 3: Observers with Opinions
Having defined the proposition and the states of our frame
of discernment, the last step consists in defining the ob-
servers who assign opinions to the frame. According to
the principle of Polyrepresentation, an abstract information
need can have several concrete representations, for instance
verbalisations by the user, such as keywords. We consider
the concrete representations of an abstract information need
as observers of our belief model. Hence, the opinion of an
observer corresponds to how well the concrete representation
reflects the abstract information need. More simply, given
a user with an abstract information need in his mind, the
words he chooses to describe this information need (i.e. his
concrete representation of the information need) might not
convey perfectly his exact information need as conceived in
his mind, because the words he choses might be ambiguous,
polysemous, or might convey part but not all of his informa-
tion need. By representing such a concrete representation
as an observer, we can formally represent the departure of
the concrete verbalisation of the information need from its
abstract conception as the observer’s opinion, decomposable
into degrees of belief, disbelief and uncertainty.
For example, a user conceives an abstract information
need and verbalises it with the keywords health bill US.
For his own reasons (e.g. past use of search engines, ex-
position to the media, linguistic skills, and so on) the user
believes that these three keywords convey his information
need. However, these keywords can also be linked to many
other different information needs or connotations. It is ex-
actly this ‘distance’ between what the user thinks and how
he phrases it that we formally represent as an opinion. The
fact that this opinion can be decomposed into elements such
as belief, disbelief, or uncertainty, allows us to model the
departure of what the user thinks from how he phrases it in
a formally tractable way.
3.3 Mapping Opinions to Evidence
To recapitulate, the previous section defined a belief model
based on a frame of discernment, where the user’s abstract
information need is seen as the proposition of the frame,
and the different concrete representations of the informa-
tion need are seen as observers who have opinions about the
truth of the proposition. This belief model is graphically
displayed in Figure 2. The opinions of these observers are in
fact our sources of evidence about the truth of the proposi-
tion, or more simply real observations. An observer having
an opinion about the truth of a proposition is analogous to
the belief, disbelief, or uncertainty of a representation about
an abstract information object.
The type of evidence or observations that we use to esti-
mate the truth of the proposition can be seen as either pos-
itive (the extent to which the user’s concrete verbalisation
x1 x2
abstract information need
Repres. 1 Repres. 2 Repres. 3 Repres. 4 Repres. 5
(evidence)
PROPOSITION
BELIEF MASS
ASSIGNMENT
Two states about the proposition of an abstract information need are discerned by the frame. These states represent different
stages in the cognitive process of the information need. Five different observers (information need representations) assign belief
mass to the frame. Belief mass consists of the observer’s belief, disbelief and uncertainty about the truth of the proposition.
Figure 2: A belief model of information needs.
conveys his abstract information need), or negative (the ex-
tent to which the user’s concrete verbalisation departs from
his abstract information need). Subjective Logic defines a
bijective mapping between the opinion and evidence space,
as follows. Let r denote positive evidence, and let s denote
negative evidence. Then, the correspondence between this
evidence and the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty b, d, u is
defined as:
b =
r
r + s+ 2
d =
s
r + s+ 2
u =
2
r + s+ 2
(3)
Equation 3 allows one to produce opinions based on statis-
tical evidence. This mapping is derived in a mathematically
elegant way (see [21] for the full derivation).
What constitutes positive and negative evidence can be
defined in various ways, depending on the situation at hand.
For example, let us assume the user who conceives an ab-
stract information need, and who verbalises it using the key-
words health bill US. Each of these three keywords can
be seen as positive evidence, because they are chosen by the
user as adequately representative and salient with respect
to his information need. In logic, this is equivalent to saying
that the keywords chosen by the user validate the truth of
the proposition (i.e. the information need). However, the
fact that bill can also convey other senses than the one
intended by the user, for instance ‘invoice’, can be seen as
negative evidence. In logic, this is equivalent to saying that
a keyword conveying a sense other than the one intended
by the user does not validate the truth of the proposition
(i.e. the information need). In this example, the positive
and negative evidence is drawn from lexical-semantic infor-
mation in a simple way. Evidence can also be drawn from
many other types of information, for instance syntactic, sta-
tistical, pragmatic or other, as described in [34]. The choice
of evidence used here is illustrative. Any type of contextual
information that can potentially be useful may be used as ev-
idence. In addition, the amount of evidence used here is also
illustrative. Our belief model allows to represent unlimited
additional evidence, simply by introducing more observers
who contribute their opinions to the frame of discernment.
4. SUBJECTIVE LOGIC OPERATIONS FOR
COMBINING REPRESENTATIONS
Unlike the example of the previous section, where we had
one concrete representation of an abstract information need,
namely keywords, in this section we look at information
needs for which we have five different representations. These
representations are cognitively and/or functionally different,
according to the principle of Polyrepresentation. Having dif-
ferent representations, the question is: how best to combine
them? We address this question by using various differ-
ent Subjective Logic operators for combining beliefs. The
remainder of this section introduces the different represen-
tations of information needs we use, and proposes different
operators for combining these representations.
4.1 Information Need Representations
The information needs used here form part of a recent IR
test collection called iSearch [37]. The iSearch test collection
is particularly well-suited for testing the polyrepresentation
of information needs, since each abstract information need
has five different representations:
1. What the user is looking for.
2. Why the user is looking for this.
3. What is the user’s background knowledge of this topic.
4. What should an ideal answer contain to solve the user’s
problem or task.
5. Which central search terms (keywords) would the user
use to express his situation and information need.
Representation 1 reflects the formulation of the current in-
formation need by the user. Representation 2 reflects the
user’s underlying work task situation or context. Represen-
tation 3 reflects the user’s current knowledge state. Repre-
sentation 4 corresponds to the ‘Narrative’ topic field in stan-
dard TREC queries. Representation 5 corresponds to the
search terms perceived as adequate keywords by the user.
The choice of these five representations as adequate reflec-
tions of an information need is discussed in [37] and also in
the earlier discussion and experimental evaluation of Kelly
& Fu [24]. Figure 3 displays a sample information need from
the iSearch test collection with its five representations.
4.2 Combining Representations
Having modelled information needs and their representa-
tions in a formal way, as shown above, the next step consists
in deciding how to combine different representations of the
Representation 1: I am looking for information about manipulation and immobilisation of nano spheres and
peptide nano particles.
Representation 2: I am starting my master thesis in which I will fabricate self-assembled peptide nano
spheres, which needs to be manipulated and immobilized. This is intended done by filling them with met-
als e.g. gold (Au) or iron (Fe) and use the electrical and magnetic properties to manipulate and immo-
bilise the spheres. This could be by using dielectrophoresis on a chip or micro fluidic device. The nano
spheres are intended for biomedical use in which techniques for manipulating biological and biomedical
materials are interesting.
Representation 3: The background knowledge is limited since the thesis is starting up this week. But I
have been working with sorting of blood cells in micro fluidic devices and flow cytometry.
Representation 4: An ideal answer could be an article showing how to manipulate peptide nano spheres. But
in it would in fact might be better if there isn’t any articles on the subject since this would mean the
research is new.
Representation 5: Manipulation, nano spheres, peptides, immobilisation.
Figure 3: Representations of a sample information need (no. 001) from the iSearch test collection [37].
information needs in a flexible and effective way. There ex-
ists extended literature on the matter of combining different
types of evidence, more formally referred to as fusing beliefs
(for instance [9, 11, 22, 23, 32, 40, 51, 60], or see [50] for an
overview). Several operators can be used for combining evi-
dence, such as conjunction or disjunction for example. Dif-
ferent operators can produce different results, especially in
case of strong conflict between the beliefs to be combined.
Furthermore, different operations ought to be used in dif-
ferent situations. We clarify this point with an example,
borrowed from [23].
Let us consider two different situations where we are called
to combine beliefs, namely (a) to model the strength of a
chain, and (b) to model the strength of a relay swimming
team. The correct operator for modelling the strength of
the chain is the principle of the weakest link. The correct
operator for modelling the strength of the relay swimming
team is the average strength of the swimmers. Considering
the average strength of the links in the chain to assess the
overall strength of the chain might represent an approxima-
tion, but it is incorrect, and it could be fatal if life depended
on it. Similarly, applying the weakest swimmer principle to
assess the overall strength of the relay team might repre-
sent an approximation, but it is incorrect, and it would give
unreliable predictions. These examples illustrate that situ-
ations, which may seem similar at first glance, can be very
different when examined more closely, and will therefore re-
quire different combination operators. We posit that this
applies to different representations of information objects
when considering their combination as part of the principle
of Polyrepresentation.
Subjective Logic contains fourteen different operators for
combining evidence4. In this work we illustrate the use
of two of these combinations, however the belief model we
present allows the use of any of these combination opera-
tors. Using Subjective Logic terminology, we will refer to
combining evidence as combining opinions, and treat these
statements as equivalent.
4.2.1 Consensus between Independent Opinions
The consensus operation of combining opinions assumes
4A. Josang’s draft book in Subjective Logic, available from:
http://persons.unik.no/josang/papers/subjective logic.pdf
that opinions are independent and that not all the combined
opinions have zero uncertainty. Opinions having zero uncer-
tainty would have complete belief or disbelief, and hence
would be in complete agreement or disagreement. Attempt-
ing to combine solely such opinions using a consensus oper-
ator could be seen as meaningless.
Formally, the consensus operator is defined as follows: Let
ωA ≡ (bA, dA, uA, aA) and ωB ≡ (bB, dB, uB , aB) be opin-
ions respectively held by two independent observers A and
B about the same proposition. Then, the consensus of opin-
ions of both A and B, denoted ωA,B = ωA ⊕ ωb, is defined
by:
bA,B =
bAuB + bBuA
κ
(4)
dA,B =
dAuB + dBuA
κ
(5)
uA,B =
uAuB
κ
(6)
aA,B =
aBuA + aAuB − (aA + aB)uAuB
uA + uB − 2uAuB
(7)
where κ = uA + uB − uAuB such that κ 6= 0, and where
aA,B = (aA+aB)/2 when uA, uB = 1. The proof is included
in [21]. The effect of the consensus operator is to reduce
uncertainty, similarly to Dempster’s rule [7] (see [21], Section
5.3, for a discussion on the difference between the two). The
consensus operator is graphically displayed in Figure 4.
Let us contextualise the consensus operator with respect
to our information need representations. Consider the infor-
mation need displayed in Figure 3 and let us assume that
we draw positive and negative evidence about these infor-
mation need representations in the simple way presented
in Section 3.3 (recall that positive and negative evidence is
transformed into the components of an opinion, namely be-
lief, disbelief and uncertainty, using Equation 3). Let us also
assume that these representations are independent, in the
sense that they can make sense independently. The combi-
nation by consensus would make different sense for represen-
tations 1 & 5 (the description of what the user is looking for
& the keywords), and for representations 3 & 5 (the user’s
background & the keywords), depending on the search sce-
nario at hand:
• In the case of a standard ad-hoc Web search scenario,
where a user is looking for topical information about
his conceived information need, the combination op-
erator should consider downweighting the user’s back-
ground because it might introduce topical drift to the
combination.
• In the case of a Web search scenario related to profes-
sional recruitment or funding, where a user is looking
for topical information in combination with his per-
sonal skills and background, such as calls for research
positions with prerequisites, the combination opera-
tor should consider the user’s background at least as
equally important as the keywords sought.
The above two scenarios illustrate the fact that the consen-
sus combination might not always be the most appropriate
way for implementing Polyrepresentation. In addition, a
disadvantage of the consensus operator is that it assumes
independence of representations. However, this assumption
is not always true. On several occasions, representations
are not only co-dependent, but also they affect one another.
This co-dependence could be modelled in the combination of
representations using the recommendation operator of Sub-
jective Logic.
4.2.2 Recommendation betweenDependentOpinions
Let us return to the example information need in Figure 3
and let us consider representations 2 & 4 (why the user is
looking for this & the ideal answer). These representations
can be seen as dependent, in the sense that they make bet-
ter sense when considered together. For example, the fact
that the user is starting a Master thesis on a topic clarifies
why finding no article on this topic would be ideal. In most
occasions, not finding the information sought would be con-
sidered a failure, however, for a user looking to conduct novel
research, not finding information is a success. This type of
user need is highly contextualised. The recommendation
operator allows to model this context when combining such
representations, in the following way.
Assume two observers A and B, where A has an opin-
ion about B, and B has an opinion about a proposition. A
recommendation of these two opinions consists of combining
A’s opinion aboutB withB’s opinion about the proposition5
in order for A to get an opinion about the proposition. For-
mally this is defined as follows: Let ωB ≡ (bB , dB, uB, aB)
be B’s opinion about a proposition expressed in a recom-
mendation to A, and let ωAB ≡ (b
A
B , d
A
B , u
A
B , a
A
B) be A’s opin-
ion about B’s recommendation. Then, the combination by
recommendation ωAB = ωAB ⊗ ω
B is A’s opinion about the
proposition as a result of the recommendation from B, de-
fined as:
bAB = bABb
B (8)
dAB = bABd
B (9)
uAB = dAB + u
A
B + b
A
Bu
B (10)
aAB = aB (11)
5B’s recommendation must be interpreted as what B rec-
ommends to A, and not necessarily as B’s real opinion.
proposition
observer A observer BA,B
ωA ⊕ ωB
combined opinion
Figure 4: Combining the opinions of two indepen-
dent observers using consensus.
proposition
observer A observer B
ωA ⊗ ωB
combined opinion
Figure 5: Combining the opinions of two dependent
observers using recommendation.
The recommendation operator is graphically displayed in
Figure 5.
The recommendation opinion is powerful in the sense that
a given recommendation can be allowed to bias significantly
the combination. In the example used above, biasing the
combination in favour of the user’s reasons for searching
(representation 2) would indicate that the option of retriev-
ing no information would be better than the option of pre-
senting the user with peripheral but not relevant informa-
tion. Since this is the opposite of what most search engines
assume and implement, such contextual knowledge could be
valuable. Finally, note the inadequacy of the consensus op-
erator in this scenario.
5. THE ROLE OF INTERACTION IN OUR
POLYREPRESENTATION FRAMEWORK
So far we have presented a Subjective Logic formalisation
of the principle of Polyrepresentation. A very important
aspect of this framework is the process of IR interaction,
because this process provides a range of elements that con-
stitute additional representations of the retrieval situation,
or more simply the Polyrepresentation input.
In the user scenarios presented so far, such elements are,
for instance, various kinds of implicit and explicit relevance
feedback information from the user to the system, based on
input data from the system. Additionally, in other scenarios,
such elements could be explicit user perceptions or opinions
given at search time or over time, such as ratings, recom-
mendations, tags, citations, etc. From the IR system side,
such elements may allow to build a polyrepresentative user
model - for the purpose of social or individual IR person-
alisation. From the user side, the output of the IR system
through the interaction iterations may provide users with
a polyrepresentation of the ‘system’ (e.g., the IR engine,
its algorithms, errors, bias, features of the retrieval collec-
tion, and so on). An example of this is the classic form of
user query modification, through suggested term lists, snip-
pets, concept structures, ontology representations, etc. All
of these can be seen as different representations made from
differing perspectives and interpretations of the same body
of information objects or algorithms.
In the present work the focus is on establishing a for-
malism that allows a mathematically tractable and flexible
combination of a wide range of representations that occur in
IIR scenarios. How to extract these representations and how
to make use of them in an interactive setting is the subject
of future work.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This work presented a logical formalisation of the principle
of Polyrepresentation for information needs in the context
of Interactive Information Retrieval (IIR). IIR is a branch
of IR that considers, not only the nature of the retrieval
model or retrieval object, but also the different actors of the
whole information seeking & interaction process. The logical
formalism introduced in this work was based on Subjective
Logic, a formal calculus for representing and operating on
probabilities in the presence of uncertainty. We introduced
a belief model for reasoning about different representations
of information needs in terms of beliefs marked by degrees of
uncertainty. We discussed the combination of different rep-
resentations with respect to different scenarios and contexts,
and we presented different formal operators for combining
representations in these different scenarios.
The flexibility of this formalisation paves the way for fur-
ther research into more structured and selective approaches
to Polyrepresentation, not only in the modeling of represen-
tations, but also in their combinations. Furthermore, we in-
tend to work towards deriving general principles for suggest-
ing specific combinations of representations. Such principles
could underpin our proposed selective approach to Polyrep-
resentation, and would enable grounding this approach to
empirical data and hence rendering it operational.
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